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Abstract   This paper describes the integration of Latin American marine fish-
eries into the global production system in the post-1945 period and the role of
foreign and domestic fleets in this process. Through reference to the state-denial
theories found in the globalisation literature, it charts the impact that the
globalisation process has had upon the exploitation and sustainability of fish
stocks in Latin American waters. It argues that while globalisation may indeed
boost environmental awareness and lead to a more sustainable level of produc-
tion through the decreased influence of local political interests, this has yet to
happen in the principal Latin American fishing nations.
Key words   Argentina, Chile, fishing industry, globalisation, Latin America,
sustainability, Mexico, Peru.
Introduction
Globalisation has not received particularly good press (Holland 1987; Rodrik 1998;
Greider 1997), being perceived as a purveyor of poverty (Wilken 1996;
Chossudovsky 1997), and a threat to democracy and governance as markets and pro-
duction are autonomised (Schlesinger 1997; Hirst and Thompson 1992).
This is equally true in the case of fisheries. Couper and Smith (1997), for ex-
ample, have argued that post-World War II globalisation processes have, by encour-
aging distant water fleets and flag of convenience registrations, led to global overca-
pacity. A consequent ‘race for fish’ has led to the overexploitation of global fish
stocks to the detriment of local marine environments. Arbo and Hersoug (1997) con-
cur, documenting how the emergence of a global market for raw whitefish not only
dislocated local employment systems in Finnmark (Norway), but also created a new
breed of fishing capital owners who had a reduced responsibility to the local com-
munity. Similar arguments as to the potentially negative effects of globalisation can
be found in the works of Kurien (1998), Johnstone (1996) and Holm (1998).
Our position is somewhat different. We contend that globalisation processes, as
evidenced in Latin American and other Third World fisheries, are not uni-dimen-
sional in character but have evolved through three distinct stages. The first phase,
covering the period from World War II up to the mid-1970s, saw distant water fleets
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plundering fish stocks off Third World countries (the ‘globalisation’ of fish produc-
tion). The establishment of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) within Economic
Exclusion Zones (EEZs) and the introduction of neo-liberal macroeconomic strate-
gies which facilitated the displacement of foreign vessels by domestic fishing fleets
geared towards the export market, heralded the second phase, which extends from
the seventies to date (the ‘globalisation’ of trade). These two phases have had a del-
eterious impact upon fish stocks (Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000). Concerns over the
sustainability of such fishing practices have prompted an unexpectedly strong regu-
latory backlash at both national and international levels (the ‘globalisation’ of [regu-
latory] control) during the 1990s. The question is, are the regulatory policies pres-
ently emerging in this third phase sufficiently powerful to counteract the negative
impacts of previous phases on stock sustainability?
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief introduc-
tion to globalisation theories, highlighting their relevance in the fisheries context.
The third section details how Latin American fisheries were integrated into the glo-
bal production system through foreign fleet activities in the post-war period. In the
fourth section, we document the trade-based globalisation phase, specifically how
by crowding out foreign fleets, the domestic fleet grew (which consequently saw
Latin American fish trade grow in both volume and value), and how this growth
contributed to stock overexploitation and increased dependence on global markets.
The fifth section examines the supra-national regulatory initiatives that have
emerged to prevent global fish stocks from being fished beyond the biological point
of no return, and traces their impact at the regional level. In the concluding section,
we assess whether current management efforts are likely to be effective in safe-
guarding regional fish stocks.
Globalisation and World Fisheries
The concept of globalisation is difficult to pin down. Standard neo-classical eco-
nomics, by equating globalisation to greater international economic integration is, in
our minds, extremely reductionist. Debate is focused upon questioning whether
commodity trade and foreign direct investment is actually increasing (van Bergeijk
and Mensink 1996; Traill 1997; Perraton et al. 1997; Kleinknecht and ter Wengel
1998) and assessing globalisation’s impact on real national incomes (Krugman and
Venables 1995; Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996). While aggregate welfare consid-
erations are undeniably important, forming as they do the basis for acceptance or re-
jection of economic liberalisation and trade deregulation arguments,1 they are ill-
equipped to guide natural resource management strategies at the local level (Brander
and Taylor 1998). This is particularly so in the context of marine fisheries. Here, the
fugitive nature of the resource, its propensity to straddle territorial waters, and the
potential for irreversible overexploitation make stocks extremely vulnerable to un-
regulated market forces. Export-based fisheries in the developing world are particu-
larly susceptible (Iheduru 1995; Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000).
The rediscovery of neo-classical theories at the economic level has been paral-
leled by the emergence of ‘state-denial’ theories within the political economy litera-
ture. Here, globalisation was seen as signifying the retreat (Strange 1996; Streeten
1 The debate is not a new one. In the 1970s, proponents of the New International Economic Order as-
serted that ongoing globalisation trends impacted adversely on developing countries (Toye 1987; Cypher
and Dietz 1997). Today, Watkins (1997) suggests that current globalisation processes are further
marginalising Sub-Saharan Africa, while Brander and Taylor (1997) illustrate how international trade
may be welfare-reducing for a small, open economy with a valuable open-access resource.Globalisation and Latin American Fisheries 145
2000) or demise (Ohmae 1990) of the nation state as markets and market forces as-
sume the high ground, a scenario that appears to offer a bleak future for many of the
world’s marine fisheries. The ‘state-denial’ school of thought has recently come un-
der fire, however, from Weiss (1997, 1998) and Phillips (1998) who instead assert
that the nation-state is in a process of adaptation—rather than decline—as
internationalisation gathers pace. The inexorable convergence of international mac-
roeconomic policies and the proliferation of supranational agreements and regula-
tory bodies have undeniably reduced the autonomy of the nation-state. However, at
the same time, it has provided an opportunity for the state to enhance its residual
domestic powers through harnessing such forces in the pursuit of domestic eco-
nomic reform. Yet, significantly, as Weiss (1997, the italics are ours) notes:
[The] state’s capacity for a co-ordinated and strategic response [to these oppor-
tunities] primarily rests upon institutional arrangements which make key deci-
sion-makers in the economic bureaucracies at once ‘autonomous’... in so far as
decision-making is largely ... insulated from clientilistic political pressures.
This is critically important given the Latin American context where, historically, a
strongly interventionist state has proved vulnerable to the rent-seeking behaviour of
narrow sectarian interests. As a consequence, our paper sets itself the task of exam-
ining whether the current regulatory phase of globalisation will, by diluting the power of
such sectarian interests, aid national fishery management efforts. Improved regulatory
control, externally aided (or ordained) and domestically implemented, can potentially be
beneficial from a stock sustainability perspective. Globalisation is not a uni-dimen-
sional process, and to understand both the reasons for and the nature of this regula-
tory backlash, we first detail how the earlier waves of globalisation catapulted the
regional marine fisheries of Latin America into their current state of crisis.
Distant Water Fleets (DWFs) and the Globalisation of Production (1945–73)
While distant water fishing is not new, French, Portuguese, and Spanish vessels hav-
ing actively fished for cod in the fishing grounds of the New World since the late
sixteenth century, the phenomena grew dramatically in the post-World War II period
(Holm 1998; WWF 1998). The depletion of domestic fish stocks saw ‘footloose’
vessels relocate to those regions where fish stocks were un- or underexploited, so
heralding the first phase of the globalisation process. The principal instigators of
such resource seeking were the Soviet, Japanese, and Spanish fleets, with over 230
million tonnes being landed by DWFs worldwide between 1950 and 1994 (WWF
1998).2
One of the most affected areas in this era of oceanic colonialism was Latin
America. As early as October 1945, the Mexican President, Manuel Avila Camacho,
expressed fears over DWF activities off the Mexican coast (El Universal 30/10/
1945, quoted by Orrego Vicuña 1984).3 Yet, while the subsequent 1947 and 1949
Fisheries Laws restricted access to the nine most important inshore marine and
shellfish fisheries to local cooperatives and licensed limited foreign fishing within
2 The same source calculates that the Soviet Union accounted for 32% (74.4 million tonnes) of the catch
taken by DWFs over the 1950-1994 period. Japan (21%, 49.6 million tonnes), Spain (10%, 22.9 million
tonnes), South Korea (5%, 11.1 million tonnes), and the Russian Federation (4%, 10.5 million tonnes)
all landed over ten million tonnes during the same period.
3 SEMARNAP (1998), for example, claim that 77% of tuna consumed in the US in 1927 was extracted
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the territorial sea,4 the access and registration requirements were unheeded and the
territorial sea went unrespected. One of the earliest prophets of doom was John
Steinbeck who, in the Log from the Sea of Cortez (1995), documented the rapacious
nature of Japanese shrimp trawlers off Baja California during the 1950s. As Mexico
became more cognisant of the wealth of her coastal waters (Frank 1946; Rosendahl
1984), enforcement procedures improved and DWFs were gradually displaced from
territorial waters.5
Elsewhere in the region, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, via the Santiago Declaration
(August 1952), laid claim to a 200-mile territorial sea that incorporated the rich fish-
eries of the Humboldt Current. However, this was not ratified internationally and,
consequently, did little to deter the forays of DWFs.6 The earliest contraventions
were off Peru, where extensive operations by the Japanese tuna fleet in the late
1940s and early 1950s forced local fishing entrepreneurs to switch their attention to
the anchovy (Molinari 1977).7 While DWF activity expanded markedly from the
mid-1960s onward, it was paralleled by growth in state activism as the Latin Ameri-
can states increasingly sought to direct the development process and establish con-
trol over local resource extraction. Chile nationalised its copper industry in 1971,
Echeverría embarked upon an extensive policy of ‘Mexicanisation’ during his 1970–
76 Presidential term, while the Brazilian military actively promoted the expansion
of state activities in the late-1960s and early-1970s.
The fisheries sector was not exempt. This was most apparent in Peru—where
the anchovy fleet was nationalised following a stock collapse in May 1973—and Ar-
gentina—where the military government introduced licence fees for foreign vessels
fishing hake stocks within a newly approved territorial sea (Decree No.17094, Janu-
ary 1967). Argentine waters had been targeted by the Soviet DWF as the interna-
tional demand for hake soared following the over-fishing of Northern cod stocks.
Hake production rose from 103,000 metric tonnes (MT) in 1965 to 598,000 MT in
1967 and, with 86% of the catch being taken by the Soviet fleet, fears were ex-
pressed for the future of the fishery. In October of the same year, regulations were
tightened, licence fees raised, Total Allowable Catches (TACs) per vessel intro-
duced, and skippers were required to disclose catches to the Argentine government.
These new measures persuaded the Soviet DWF to re-deploy to less-policed African
waters (Marine Fisheries Review 1989).
The tide was turning. Latin American nationalism coincided with African and
Asian desires to introduce a zone of ‘exclusive economic jurisdiction in the high
seas contiguous to territorial waters’ (Orrego Vicuña 1984). These forces, which cul-
minated in The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), held in Caracas in June 1974, subsequently legitimated the notion of an EEZ.
Significantly, the world’s major maritime powers accepted the delineation of such a
4 The outer limit of the territorial sea was set as nine miles from the low-water mark, although the US
and other fishing nations refused to endorse this claim (Arce 1996).
5 Soberanes Fernandez (1994) details how 42 unlicensed foreign vessels were impounded by the Mexi-
can authorities between 1956 and 1963. US and Cuban shrimp fishing licenses were gradually rescinded
in the 1970s, while fears over the status of demersal stocks on the Campeche Bank led to the suspension
of Cuban and Soviet trawling licenses in 1976 (Marine Fisheries Review 1979).
6 The same fate befell the claims of Argentina (1946), Panama (1947), Costa Rica (1948), El Salvador
(1950), Honduras (1951), Nicaragua (1965), Uruguay (1969), and Brazil (1970) to either continental
shelf waters off their respective coasts or a 200-mile maritime zone (Dupuy and Vignes 1991; Orrego
Vicuña 1984).
7 Although partially underwritten by US finance capital in its early years, the dramatic growth in the
Peruvian anchovy fishery offered a striking example of how resource rents could be captured locally if
foreign fleets could somehow be excluded (Molinari 1977; Ibarra, Reid, and Thorpe 2000).Globalisation and Latin American Fisheries 147
zone, although its ‘exclusivity’ was contested at the time.8 UNCLOS III, by placing
the rights to and responsibilities for marine fisheries management in the hands of the
local coastal state effectively signalled the end of the global production phase. In its
place, a new, trade-based globalisation phase emerged.
EEZs and the Globalisation of Trade (1974–90s)
However, DWF activity in Latin America did not cease overnight. Many countries,
having obtained the right to exploit their EEZs, now found themselves with insuffi-
cient vessels to do so. The optimal response was to licence DWFs whilst encourag-
ing domestic fleet growth, and DWF catches continued to remain significant in vol-
ume terms until the late 1980s.9 The introduction of incentives to encourage a do-
mestic ‘race for fish’ saw a swift buildup in local fleet capacity, converting Latin
America into a major global player in the international fish trade in the process.
However, it also militated against the harvesting of stocks in a sustainable manner
while raising the spectre of export revenue vulnerability in those instances where
nations became overdependent upon particular market outlets.
Fleet Growth and the Domestic ‘Race for Fish’
Peru, which had developed the world’s largest industrial fishery by the 1960s, ac-
counted for almost 40% of the regional industrial fishing capacity at the time of
UNCLOS III (table 1).
However, a lack of investment in the newly nationalised anchovy fishery, the
crowding-out of private capital in the associated pelagic fisheries, and the general
failure to support the development of non-pelagic fisheries stunted fleet growth
(Ibarra, Reid, and Thorpe 2000). By 1995, Peru supplied just 11.2% of the regional
fleet, ranking fourth in GRT terms after Mexico, Argentina, and Chile.10
The substantial growth in the Mexican fleet, in particular the buildup of its tuna
operations, can largely be attributed to fisheries policy in the late 1970s. A combina-
tion of excessive liquidity on the international capital markets and burgeoning do-
mestic oil revenues were tapped to fuel fleet expansion. The fleet grew from 22 ves-
sels in 1975 to 106 in 1982, rivaling the United States as the world’s largest. Growth
slowed thereafter as a US embargo (1980–86) on Mexican tuna imports sharply cur-
tailed the country’s trade in tuna products (Rosendahl 1984; Cicin-Sain et al. 1986;
Ibarra, Reid, and Thorpe 2000). Venezuelan fleet growth was also tuna-led and dates
from the early 1980s, when a combination of low prices for second-hand tuna ves-
sels on the US and international markets and low fuel costs encouraged investment
in the sector (Marine Fisheries Review 1986; Weidner and Hall 1993).
In both Argentina and Chile, fisheries growth was primarily attributable to the
trickle-down effects of trade-enhancing, neo-liberal policy. The aggressive exchange
8 This zone can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the low-water mark. The subsequent 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea ratified this, reaffirming the rights of coastal states to exercise Exclu-
sive Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) within their EEZs.
9 DWF catches peaked at around 2.5 million MT in 1989–90 [although this represented only 13% of the
1989–90 regional catch due to the sharp expansion in regional fishing fleets]. They declined swiftly
thereafter following the withdrawal of Soviet government subsidies to its mid-water fleet—which was
then targeting jack mackerel and other low-value pelagic species (Weidner and Hall 1993).
10 While the biggest fleet growth recorded over the period was in Panama (and to a much lesser extent,
Honduras), this was where regional ‘flag of convenience’ registrations were concentrated. If the Panama
and Honduran data is excluded, Peru’s share rises to 14.9%, the four principal regional fishing nations
(Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico) accounting for 79.4% of regional GRT.Thorpe and Bennett 148
rate policy of the Pinochet government in Chile (1973–89), aided by reprivatisation and
the removal of access restrictions in the Northern industrial pelagic fishery, encouraged
both unprecedented growth and concentration (Peña-Torres 1996, 1997; Thorpe, Ibarra,
and Reid 2000). By 1990, the fisheries sector directly employed about 115,000 people,
utilised capital valued at around US$3.5 billion, and accounted for one-ninth of the
country’s export earnings (Pavez 1994). In Argentina, recent fleet growth has been even
more dramatic than table 1 suggests. When the neo-liberal government of Carlos Menem
took office in 1991, fleet statistics indicated a gross registered tonnage (GRT) of
128,400—inclusive of 263 trawlers of over 150 tonnes GRT. Four years later, 371 such
trawlers were registered, and total national capacity leapt to 226,000 GRT, as a combina-
tion of sharp tariff reductions on imported vessels, simplified procedures for
‘naturalising’ foreign vessels, and a more relaxed regulatory stance prompted a
surge in domestic vessel registrations (Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000).
By 1995, regional hold capacity, at 1.4 million GRT, was over eight times higher
than it had been a quarter of a decade earlier in pre-UNCLOS days. It has been paral-
leled by a diminution in DWF activity, as the number of joint ventures between national
and foreign fishing companies has grown.11 This has not only allowed Latin American
coastal states to expand production directed towards the domestic market, but also
converted the region into a major participant in the international fish trade.12
Table 1
Gross Registered Tonnage (000 GRT):
Latin American Industrial Fishing Fleets, 1970–95a
Country 1970 GRT 1995 GRT Average growth 1970–95
Panamab 12.1 346.4 14.4
Mexico 8.1 299.6 15.5
Argentina 9.5 212.6 13.3
Chile 16.0 168.2 9.9
Peru 61.6 157.0 3.8
Venezuela 26.5 95.5 5.3
Ecuador 15.7 52.7 5.0
Uruguay 1.8 20.6 10.3
Brazil 8.0 17.8 3.3
Hondurasb 0.8 14.8 12.4
Colombia 0.1 14.1 21.9
Nicaragua * 12.4 N/A
El Salvador 4.9 3.6 –1.2
Costa Rica 0.0 3.1 N/A
Guatemala 0.8 2.5 4.7
TOTAL 165.0 1,400.9
Source: FAO (1998) and personal communication.
* Signifies less than 100 GRT.
a GRT figures are for vessels over 100 GRT.
b The Panamanian and Honduran figures should be viewed with some caution due to the registration of
vessels under ‘flags of convenience.’
11 Rosendahl (1984) details foreign incursions into the Mexican tuna industry, while Thorpe, Ibarra, and
Reid (2000) discuss how the neo-liberal economic model has stimulated other inward fisheries invest-
ment in the region.
12 Between 1961 and 1993 South America saw the supply of fish rise from 6.0 kg to 8.9 kg per capita,
despite the regional population rising from around 151 million to 309 million over the same period
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Trade Globalisation: Latin American Shares in the International Fish Market
Latin America’s growing incursion into international fish markets can be illustrated
by reference to the market for whitefish fillets (fresh, chilled, or frozen).13 This mar-
ket, worth US$294 million in 1970, was dominated by North American and northern
European processors. However, overfishing of cod and related species in northern
waters had already encouraged exploratory fishing by DWFs in the South Atlantic
by the late 1960s and early 1970s. In Argentina, as we have already noted, Soviet
vessels had been particularly prominent in harvesting hake stocks until their rede-
ployment to African waters. Now, swift fleet growth (table 1) in the wake of
UNCLOS III enabled Argentina to establish a new export-processing industry
centred on frozen hake fillets (figure 1).
By 1979, Argentina had captured 12.1% of the market in volume terms (4.1% in
value terms). The 1980s were a ‘lost’ decade, however, as adverse economic policies
and fishing restrictions introduced following the Falklands/Malvinas war saw Ar-
gentina underperform the trend rate of growth, with global market share conse-
quently slumping to 9.3% (3.9% in value terms) by 1990. The deterioration was re-
versed under the Menem administration, as new legislation encouraged the local
registration of a number of large factory/freezer vessels, with filleted fish exports
growing 58% in the 1990s (Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000). As Argentine market
share was restored to around 12%, improved processing standards allowed Argentina
to capture an increased share of global export revenues in this particular sub-market
13 An earlier working paper of ours also details developments in the fishmeal and tuna markets (Thorpe
and Bennett 2000).
Figure 1.  Whitefish Fillet Exports
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(6.9%). A similar story emerges in Chile. Favourable credit facilities and an export-
oriented development strategy underpinned a sharp expansion in hake landings dur-
ing the 1980s, and Chilean market share grew from 0.2% in 1980 (0.1% of export
revenues) to 3.4% by 1995 (5.2% of revenues). Elsewhere in the region, Uruguay,
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico established filleting plants to serve the lucrative
whitefish fillet export market.
Regional Overfishing: The Extent of the Problem
The sharp escalation in global fishing activity over the last quarter of a century has
precipitated growing concerns about the sustainability of such operations (FAO
2000). This has been evidenced at the regional level not only in the academic litera-
ture (Castilla 1997; Nadal Egea 1996), but also through the introduction of input
(gear and boat length restrictions) and output (closed seasons and TACs) controls by
national fisheries authorities during the 1980s. In Peru, the state bail-out of the be-
leaguered anchovy fishery following the 1973/4 El Niño offered a unique opportunity to
regulate catches along maximum sustainable yield (MSY) lines, but this opportunity was
sacrificed in favour of maintaining fishing incomes—and periodic stock collapses have
followed. Chile, too, has not circumvented the overfishing problem. Schurman (1996)
has documented the collapse of hake and loco (snail) stocks. Ibarra, Reid, and Thorpe
(2000) noted the sharp reductions in pilchard and Aracuanian herring landings, while the
rise and equally rapid demise of Patagonian toothfish harvests has been addressed by a
number of recent papers (Ecoceanos 1998; Isofish 1999; Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid
2000). Even jack mackerel, which had come to account for around half of Chilean
landings during the 1990s following the collapse of other stocks, finally succumbed
in 1998, causing the government to ban all reduction activities involving the species
for almost a year (Fish Information Services, Sea-World, various).
With 10 of the 16 principal regional fish stocks now officially designated by
FAO as fully to overexploited (table 2), similar trends have emerged—or are emerg-
ing—elsewhere. In Argentina, recriminations have been voiced over the assignation
of harvesting rights to a rapidly diminishing hubbsi hake stock (Thorpe, Ibarra, and
Reid 2000), while Uruguay has established a summer fishing ban to safeguard its
hake stocks (Fish Information Services, Sea-World, 31/12/1999). In Mexico, the
fisheries programme of the Ernesto Zedillo administration (1995–2000) was scat-
tered with promises to ‘combat resource degradation,’ ‘reverse overfishing,’ and
‘promote responsible fishing practices’ (SEMARNAP 1996).
The Pitfalls of Excessive Export Dependence
As the century drew to a close, the latest concerns over the fate of the Chilean jack
mackerel fishery were matched by renewed fears about the dangers of excessive de-
pendence upon the global economy. The collapse of the East Asian economies at the
end of 199714 had profound implications for the ‘direction and the composition of
trade flows, particularly for primary commodities’ (UNCTAD 1998). Fisheries were
not exempted. Contagion, in the Latin American marine fisheries case, has been es-
14 GDP contracted significantly in the South East Asian region in 1998, with Indonesia experiencing the
biggest drop (–14%). The countries that were less affected still recorded GDP growth rates of half the
previous year (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific 1999). The crisis was expected to
cut 1.3 percentage points (down to 3% from 4.3%) off Latin American GDP growth in 1998 (ECLAC
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sentially transmitted in three forms. First, market reduction—as reduced purchasing
power in the East Asian region was reflected in a decline in fish imports from Latin
America. Second, market displacement—as rapidly depreciating currencies made
East Asian fish products more competitive in the international market and squeezed
Latin American exports to the rest of the world. Finally, lower license receipts—as
foreign exchange shortages forced East Asian DWFs to reduce their forays in the re-
gion. These impacts were not of an identical magnitude across the region, however.
The fishery most affected by falling license receipts was the Falklands Islands
(Malvinas) squid fishery. Already suffering from growing Argentine competition,15
the East Asian implosion came just before payment of a 10% deposit against license
fees for the 1998 season was due (1 December 1997). When no vessels came up with
the deposit, the Falklands administration capitulated to Korean government pres-
sures and reduced license fees by 10%, (the deposit to 5%) while offering extended
payment terms.16 This concession was insufficient, and the Korean DWF fishing
within the Falklands EEZ dropped from 116 in 1997 to 61 in 1998 (Fish Information
Services, Sea-World Market Report 26/1/1998). License receipts, the islands main
foreign currency earner, consequently fell by around £2.5 million, to £18 million.
Market reduction was most noticeable with regard to fishmeal, with the East
Table 2
Principal Latin American Marine Fisheries‡ and Present Status of Exploitation‡‡
Status Species Participating Countries
Fully to overexploited Peruvian anchovy Peru, Chile, Ecuador,
Araucanian herring Argentina, Uruguay
South American pilchard




Fully exploited Yellowfin tuna Mexico, Venezuela
Moderately to fully exploited Chilean jack mackerel Panama, Chile, Peru, Ecuador
Californian pilchard Mexico, Argentina
Pacific anchovy
Southern blue whiting
Moderately exploited Chub mackerel Chile, Ecuador, Peru
Unknown Round sardinella Venezuela
Sources: Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid (1999) and FAO (1997a,b).
Note: Pelagic species are in italics.
‡: Criteria for inclusion: landings exceeded 50,000 tons in at least one country between 1980 and 1995.
‡‡: As defined by FAO (1997a).
15 As squid stocks straddle Argentine/Falklands waters, one nation’s catch impinges adversely on the
other in the absence of any voluntary restraint agreements. Hence, the rapid buildup in the Argentine
domestic fleet and cheaper Argentine DWF squid license fees saw Argentine landings rise from 46,000
tonnes in 1991 to 260,000 tonnes by 1996. In contrast, the Falkland’s catch fell from 174,745 tonnes to
79,803 tonnes over the same period (World Fishing December 1997).
16 Korea, which generally accounts for 80% of the total squid catch off the islands (Japan 18%, Taiwan
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Asian aquaculture industry accounting for around 60% of Chilean and Peruvian ex-
ports in the early 1990s. Peru emerged relatively unscathed from the Asian crisis as
China, its main market in the region (38% of 1997 fishmeal exports), stood firm.
Chile was less fortunate. The baht’s free-fall in late 1997 and throughout 1998 led
Thai aquaculturists to reduce their purchases of Chilean fishmeal by US$31.2 mil-
lion (63.9%) during the first 11 months of 1998. Chilean fishmeal exports to Taiwan
also fell sharply, down US$35.5 million (29%) over the preceding year. While ex-
port growth to the UK and German markets helped offset these losses, the loss of the
East Asian markets compounded the effect of the 1997/8 El Niño event, and fish
meal revenues were down US$81.4 million compared to 1997 (Subsecretaria de
Pesca 1998). Market displacement details are much harder to disentangle and
quantify, although Korean ‘dumping’ of illex squid in the American market in April
1998, by severely depressing US market prices, undoubtedly prejudiced Mexican
squid exporters. There are also suggestions that Latin American tuna exporters saw
their market position deteriorate following the 20% drop in US prices as the Asian
tuna fleet redirected its catch to the more profitable US market in September 1998.
South American shrimp exporters also saw margins squeezed as South East Asian
shrimp trade flows shifted from Japan to the US (Fish Information Services, Sea-
World, 7/10/1998 and 12/2/1999).
While vulnerability to international market forces and disturbances is nothing
new, the magnitude of—and the dislocations caused by—such exogenous shocks
could, in this global age, encourage:
the state [to] re-invent and strengthen itself at the domestic level...and to
implement a set of preferences which crucially, were entirely consistent with
the ‘interests’ of the globalised international system (Phillips 1998).
This notion is particularly appealing given the depleted state of regional fish
stocks and the growth in supranational authority and environmental consciousness at
the global level. But just how realistic is it to expect international institutions and
conservationist ideals to feed into, and thereby reenforce, (sustainable) fisheries
management policies in Latin America?
The Globalisation of [Regulatory] Control (1990s-)
Supranational pressures which encourage/coerce coastal nations to regulate their
marine fisheries more effectively have no one particular source, but emanate from a
plethora of international and quasi-international bodies. Although some of these
pressures date from earlier decades, they are nevertheless best viewed as precursors
of what is an ongoing and accentuating process of regulatory control. Equally, these
processes are clearly not unique to Latin America. Unfortunately, however, as we
shall illustrate within the Latin American context, while their collective effect is to
strengthen global control mechanisms—at present these efforts are largely uncoordi-
nated and, at times, can be contradictory in intent. In order to systematise these dis-
tinctive global and local regulatory influences, we differentiate between those global
pressures that seek to influence fisheries management from a consumption perspec-
tive (demand-side pressures) and those which are more likely to reduce or modify
harvesting levels (supply-side pressures). We then examine how local regulatory re-
sponses have evolved during the last decade.Globalisation and Latin American Fisheries 153
Global Supply-Side Pressures
Current supply-side pressures on Latin American fisheries can be decomposed into
four elements. First, those which, by resolving ill-defined territorial rights to fish
stocks, indirectly offer/strengthen opportunities to restrict fishing activity [access
clarification measures]. Second, proposals intended to reduce pressures on non-tar-
get species [‘bycatch’ reduction measures]. Third, initiatives which seek to safe-
guard (selected) fish stocks by reducing or restricting fishing effort [explicit effort
reduction measures], and finally, those which propose market-based solutions to
curb overfishing [implicit effort reduction measures].
The most important example of access clarification measures is the 1995 UN
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNASFS).
Although UNCLOS III provided states with the opportunity to manage resources
falling within their EEZs, the obligation to cooperate to conserve either high-seas or
straddling stocks was less clear.17 UNASFS, which represented a ‘sea-change’ in in-
ternational fisheries management, rectified this and:
…for the first time, the objective of international fisheries management became
sustainable fishing, ecosystem protection, conservation of biodiversity, and the
precautionary approach to fisheries management (Weber 1998).
Although UNASFS provided a global management blueprint, operationalisation
of its recommendations is delegated to regional fisheries organisations which, hav-
ing identified the stocks to be managed and local competencies, are expected to
carry out 13 specified tasks—including developing, monitoring, and enforcing ap-
propriate conservation measures (Arts. 9, 10). In Latin America, the UNASFS re-
gime has most relevance for the pelagic fisheries of the South–East Pacific and the
squid (and, to a lesser extent, hake) fisheries in the South-West Atlantic.18
In the case of the South-West Atlantic, fisheries jurisdiction has been compli-
cated by the contiguity and, in some instances, overlapping, of the Argentine EEZ
and the Falklands Islands Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ). The conclusion of mili-
tary warfare in 1982 was succeeded by a period of oceanic economic warfare in
which the main victims were local fish stocks. British failure to institute an effective
fisheries management policy within the MEZ simply encouraged DWF activity and,
by 1985, it was clear that the local illex squid fishery was under threat (FICZ 1987/
8). As Argentina sought to reestablish its rights to manage local fish stocks by li-
censing Soviet and Bulgarian trawlers to fish Argentine waters in 1986, the British
government responded by creating the Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and
Management Zone [FICZ] (Bisbal 1993). Competition ensued as the two states en-
gaged in a license war with scant regard as to the sustainability of the underlying
squid stocks. Although partial agreement regarding joint control and management of
stocks within a Falklands Outer Conservation Zone was reached in 1990, competi-
tion subsequently escalated once more as a neo-liberal inclined Argentine govern-
ment pursued a more aggressive fisheries expansion policy (see footnote 15). Fears
over the effect that such competition was having upon its principal income source
17 Although UNCLOS III did oblige states to introduce measures to conserve the living resources of the
high seas both individually, and in cooperation with other states (Art.117), the precise form which these
obligations were to take was not spelled out (FAO 1992). In the Latin American case, Orrego Vicuña
(1995) attributes the failing to a combination of the region ignoring the interests of other nations which
fished migratory species on the high seas and a ‘too close’ adherence to the historic US position on the
issue.
18 As tuna, a highly migratory stock, is regulated by its own independent authority, we analyze this con-
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caused the Falklands legislature to become one of the first to endorse the UNASFS
regime in 1995. When Argentina ratified the agreement in 1997, it not only contrib-
uted to the easing of tension between the two countries, but also opened up the pos-
sibility of improved regional fisheries management via greater collaboration within
the framework of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission (SAFC). Yet, while
Anglo-Argentine scientific cooperation has indeed taken place regarding the re-
gional high seas fishery, there is impatience regarding the lack of progress in inter-
national forums for protecting stocks in international waters (Communiqué of XVII
Meeting of the SAFC, 15–6 June 2000, as reported by Fish Information Services,
Sea-World, various).
The situation in the South East Pacific pelagic fishery is somewhat different,
however, as none of the coastal states has ratified UNASFS, despite the existence of
mature jack mackerel stocks up to 1,500 miles off the coast. Instead, Chile took the
unilateral decision to advance the notion of a Presencial Sea19 within which it in-
tended to develop national economic interests (Article 154 of the 1991 ‘enabling’
legislation specifically dealt with the need to establish standards for the conserva-
tion and management of migratory/straddling stocks). While the concept is viewed
within Chile as a logical geographical extension of the EEZ (Joyner and DeCola
1993), it is nevertheless diametrically opposed to the ethos of the UNASFS initia-
tive, which allows DWFs a voice in regional management plans. A compromise po-
sition, proposed by the Southeast Pacific Convention for Conserving Straddling
Stocks (Ecuador, Peru, and Chile) in 1997, permits coastal nations to retain a veto
authority in quota and licensing negotiations (Kibel 2000).
Unfortunately, as these two contrasting examples show, the effectiveness of this
supranational impulse to clarify access rights to potentially vulnerable fish stocks is
diminished by low, local ratification rates20 and the lack of progress in securing in-
ternational agreement on high-seas management issues.
A similar ratification problem dogs the operationalisation of the FAO Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), as well as the managerial effectiveness
of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), to cite two explicit ef-
fort reduction measures. The CCRF, whose origins can be traced to the 1984 Rome
Conference on Fisheries Management and Development, was formally approved by
FAO in October 1995. Global in scope, the code seeks to realise ten key objectives
via the promotion of wide-ranging controls on effort and ecosystem management in
line with the precautionary approach.21 The Code has two weaknesses, however.
First, as it is largely a voluntary code, its impact is more subliminal than overt, at-
tempting to encourage nation states to incorporate CCRF provisions within national
maritime legislation [see penultimate section, Steinberg 1999; Feidi 1999]. Second,
while the Code does have teeth insofar as it absorbs the binding 1993 FAO Compli-
ance Agreement,22 the Agreement remains inoperative, as just 14 of the necessary 25
signatories have been collected to date—Argentina (1996) and Mexico (1999) being
the only Latin American signatories.
19 The Presential Sea extends Chile’s jurisdictional responsibility to a further 19,967,337 kilometres2
(EEZ = 3,490,175 kilometres2) by incorporating all the ocean space enclosed within the triangle extend-
ing from the tip of northern Chile, out to Easter Island, and down to the South Pole.
20 Presently, only Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Uruguay, and the British government (on behalf of depen-
dencies in the region) are signatories (source: www.un.org/Depts/los/los164st.htm).
21 These include: to establish principles for responsible fishing practices, facilitating international coop-
eration in the protection of fisheries resources, promoting the contribution of fish products to food secu-
rity/quality, and to promote responsible trade in fish products (www.fao.org/fi/agreem/codecond/
ficonde.asp).
22 The Agreement to Promote Compliance with Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
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Unlike the CCRF, which is non-stock specific, the IATTC seeks to regulate tuna
catches in the Eastern Pacific Ocean through effort restriction.23 Formed in 1949, the
IATTC introduced yellowfin tuna quotas as long ago as 1962 in an effort to establish
maximum sustained catch. These quotas, determined on a ‘first-come, first-served’
basis, became a source of intense discord in the following decades on two counts.
First, the US refused to acknowledge that the establishment of 200-mile EEZs took
precedence over IATTC-determined yellowfin quotas, a stance that resulted in the
1980–86 US embargo of Mexican tuna products, as documented earlier. Second, the
rapid buildup of the regional fleet, most notably in Mexico, led to Latin American
demands for greater quota shares. A failure to resolve these issues satisfactorily
caused Mexico (1978), Costa Rica (1979), and Ecuador (1980) to withdraw from the
IATTC, leaving the East Pacific tuna fishery bereft of any internationally agreed
conservation measure (Pulvenis 1989; Nadal Egea 1996; Constance and Bonanno
1999). Yet the IATTC may well reemerge as an effective regulatory authority as a
consequence of the mediatory role it has played during the ‘dolphin-safe’ contro-
versy (discussed in more detail below), causing Mexico and Venezuela to rejoin the
IATTC in 1994 and pledge significant funds for ‘dolphin-safe fishing research’
(SEMARNAP 1998; Constance and Bonanno 1999).
In contrast, bycatch reduction measures seek to refine—as opposed to neces-
sarily reduce—the fishing effort applied in order to reduce mortality rates among
non-target species. While the commitment can remain a voluntary one, in instances
such as the US embargo on non-dolphin safe tuna from Mexico, Ecuador, Panama,
and Venezuela, it may be statutorily enforced. The embargo stems from the early
1980s, when US corporate initiatives to increase tuna sales through retailing dol-
phin-safe tuna were reflected in legislative amendments to the 1972 US Marine
Mammals Protection Act (MMPA), which compelled the US tuna fleet to sharply re-
duce dolphin bycatch. In 1988, a further modification of the MMPA extended these
provisions to countries which exported East Pacific tuna to the US.24 The true sig-
nificance of these modifications became apparent only after the US embargoed tuna
exports from non-complying countries following a successful petition by the eco-
logical group, Earth Island Institute, and others to the US courts in 1990.25
The embargo ran contrary to the strong global currents in favour of free interna-
tional trade, however, and the US action was condoned after a GATT panel was con-
vened at Mexico’s request in late 1991.26 Despite this ruling, Mexico chose not to
pursue the panel’s recommendations—and obtain a full GATT Council decision
upon the issue—in order to avoid prejudicing the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. In-
stead, voluntary Mexican and Latin American attempts to reduce dolphin mortality
rates, combined with local ratification of the newly established International
Programme for the Conservation of Dolphins (1998), were sufficient to satisfy most
23 A kindred body, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) estab-
lished in 1969, which is charged with determining appropriate management measures for Atlantic tuna
has been ‘rather less interventionist’ to date (Weber 1998).
24 Although the original 1972 MMPA had not laid down bycatch limits, 1976 and 1984 amendments es-
tablished maximum annual dolphin mortality rates of 76,000 and 20,500 animals, respectively. A subse-
quent 1988 amendment required third countries to restrict mortality rates to 1.25 times the US mortality
rate (Nadal Egea 1996).
25 The embargo applied to more than 20 countries (including Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Colom-
bia).
26 The GATT line was unequivocal; the US needed to treat the products of importing/exporting countries
on a par with their domestically produced equivalents rather than comparing the regulations determining
the production thereof. An acceptance of the US position would have been tantamount to allowing states
to use embargoes and the like in order to foist national environmental laws upon third countries (de
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US environmental considerations, and the embargo was removed the following
year.27 In a similar vein, the threat of US sanctions being applied to shrimp export-
ing countries which had failed to adopt turtle-excluder devices (TEDs) encouraged
Latin American states to consider regional self-regulation. The Inter-American Con-
vention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles was approved in 1996
and was subsequently signed by Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, the US, and
Venezuela (de Andrade 1999; SEMARNAP 1998; Nadal Egea 1996; San Miguel
1995; Fish Information Services, Sea-World).
Finally, we contend that market-based solutions derived from the neo-classical
economic orthodoxy currently ascendant across the globe offers opportunities for an
implicit reduction in fishing effort. Christy (1997), for example, noted that, “Eco-
nomic measures that indirectly restrain the tendency for over investment might be of
value in certain kinds of situations.” His ensuing proposal, that governments remove
subsidies and extract resource rents, has found favour within the World Bank and the In-
ter-American Development Bank, two institutions highly influential in regional policy
development in Latin America (Lemay 1998). Yet the removal of subsidies estimated to
be worth between US$14–20.5 billion globally, and equivalent to 20–25% of the sector’s
annual revenues (Milazzo 1998), has only a lagged, albeit growing, impact upon the
industry’s cost structure.28 Consequently, unless vessels are decommissioned in the
short-term, pressures upon underlying resource stocks remain undiminished. To date,
there is little support for decommissioning; however, governments are viewing the lay-
ing up of residual state fleets and processing plants as an opportunity forgone given the
fiscally more attractive option of privatisation. Nevertheless, some market-induced re-
structuring is beginning to take place. This is most notable in Chile, where the private
sector response to declining fish stocks and corporate profits has seen the three major
northern industrial fishing companies combining forces and cutting its fleet (Ecoceanos
News, 31 Aug. 1999; Fish Information Services, Sea-World, 1 Sept. 1999).
While subsidy removal operates to curb effort at the input level, ITQs and TACs
tackle the problem of excessive effort at the output level. Setting an appropriate
TAC can protect the stock from depletion, while the introduction of ITQs not only
allows resource rents to be extracted, but has the additional advantage of removing
the overcapitalisation problem by squeezing the least efficient vessels out of the in-
dustry/fishery (Hannesson 1994). Yet regional attempts to support ‘market Darwin-
ism’ have generally floundered to date. First, doubts have been expressed regarding
the constitutional validity of state actions to limit access to Chilean fish stocks
(Peña-Torres 1997; Bernal and Aliaga 1999). Second, there is strong skepticism,
most evident within the Peruvian fishing lobby, as to the ability of the state to effectively
enforce such quotas (Fishing News International, Nov. 1998). Finally, and most sig-
nificantly, the ITQ preoccupation with efficiency is perceived to ride roughshod
over alternative fisheries management goals, such as improving employment and in-
comes in fishing communities (Bernal and Aliaga 1999) and sparked a strong, ulti-
mately successful, anti-ITQ community protest in Chile in 1999 (Ecoceanos News,
12 November 1999). Consequently, although ITQs have not disappeared from the
Latin American fisheries agenda, their present ambit is restricted to five small Chil-
ean stocks. However, there are signs that this may change in the future.29
27 Constance and Bonanno (1999) provide a detailed synopsis of the passage of dolphin safe legislation
through the US Congress.
28 While the removal of fuel subsidies can have an almost instantaneous effect upon the decision to put
to sea, the elimination of cheap credit and loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation allowances, and tax
deferral programmes impact long-run cost structures.
29 The Chilean Congress, for example, is expected to introduce a quota-based fisheries law covering its
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Global Demand-Side Pressures
Current demand-side pressures originate primarily from customer concerns as to the
quality and nature of internationally traded seafood products.
Wessells (1998a) argued that with the increased economic integration of world
economies and a growing international seafood trade, the importance of product
quality standards has become evermore paramount. Such quality concerns are le-
gitimated by the 1994 WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPA), which
permits countries to invoke trade sanctions when genuine health and safety concerns
can be identified. Although, theoretically, there are no upper quality bounds, in the
absence of further scientific evidence countries are expected to harmonise their
health regulations with existing international standards, guidelines, and recommen-
dations. The most common global standard is the seven-point Hazard Analysis Criti-
cal Control Point (HACCP) programme which seeks to eliminate microbiological
hazards at various points in the food processing chain (Caswell and Hooker 1996).
Adopted by the EU, Canada, and the US, and with a similar set of standards apply-
ing in Japan, the programme is a powerful weapon in the pursuit of improved inter-
national hygiene levels. In Latin America, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador,
Peru, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil have all implemented such procedures
(Cato 1998). Unfortunately, while quality standards of this type remain ‘general
guidelines for government behaviour’ (Filhol 1995), they are likely to have a
counter-productive impact on two counts when viewed from a fisheries
sustainability perspective. First, the growing adoption— either nationally or interna-
tionally—of HACCP standards creates a dual market for traded fish products, allow-
ing HACCP-approved operators to expand capacity to take up any slack arising as
non-compliant producers are forced out of the ‘quality’ market.30 Second, as the
HACCP programme is a fixed-cost system, it encourages high rates of harvesting/
processing in order to drive-down unit processing costs.
Sustainability, however, was a critical consideration in the articulation of con-
sumer preferences vis-à-vis the nature of internationally traded seafood products
in the case of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC, formed in 1996 as
a consequence of a joint initiative by the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever (a lead-
ing international fish buyer and processor), promotes sustainable fishing practices
across the globe, with independent MSC-accredited certifiers awarding ‘eco-labels’
to complying harvesters (Scott 1998; Constance and Bonanno 1999). Consumers ex-
press their preference by voting for (purchasing) eco-labelled products, thereby in-
troducing a market-based approach—as opposed to a state-directed initiative, as in
the case of dolphin-safe tuna noted earlier—to sustainable seafood production which
circumvents possible WTO objections (Gu∂ mundsson and Wessells 2000).
Although in its infancy, the scheme has aroused tremendous interest at both the
academic and industry levels. The ability of the MSC to help redirect global fisher-
ies exploitation along a more sustainable path, however, will be dependent upon a
number of critical factors. These include whether: enforceable private, or sole, own-
ership rights to the fish stock can be established; all relevant stakeholders can be
brought on board (Long 1999; Braathen 1999); consumer preferences for sustainable
fishing practices outweigh any eco-label price premium which may arise due to cer-
tification costs (Wessells 1998b:); Unilever shares a common interest in sustainable
fisheries management practices—and, moreover, whether the public believes this to
be the case (Steinberg 1999; Wessells 1998b); the creation of yet another supra-na-
30 The extent to which additional pressures are placed upon the underlying fish stock will depend upon
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tional body clouds the global regulatory framework further to the detriment of the
fisheries concerned (Hersoug, Holm, and Rånes 1999). To date the MSC has been
less influential on Latin American fisheries management systems than product qual-
ity harmonisation standards.31
Local Regulatory Responses
Local fisheries management policies were, by and large, driven by the desire to an-
nex coastal waters into territorial seas, as we have noted earlier. The exception was
Mexico where, in line with local revolutionary ideals, legislation delegated exclu-
sive access rights over the country’s principal marine and shellfish fisheries to the
cooperative sector. Although pelagic stock collapses in Chile (1964/5) and Peru
(1972/3) proved to be harbingers of what was to come, an illusion of resource abun-
dance continued to determine management strategies in the immediate post-
UNCLOS era. Although policy remained essentially productionist in orientation,
management focus gradually shifted from supporting large-scale, parastatal harvest-
ing and processing operations to aiding private sector resource extraction in line
with the newly ascendant neo-liberal development beliefs. Yet, neo-liberal preoccu-
pations to privatise the fleet rather than the resource merely transformed the ‘race
for fish’ into a sprint, highlighting the need for more coherent and comprehensive
fisheries policies (Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000). It is no coincidence that the
region’s four principal marine fishing nations introduced far-reaching fisheries laws
during the 1990s, legislation which, we contend, marks the local beginnings of the
third globalisation phase. These laws (and related ancillary legislation) confirm the
virtual exclusion of DWFs from national waters, embrace the CCRF either explicitly
(Argentina and Mexico) or implicitly (case of Peru),32 institute HACCP standards
(most countries), and incorporate dolphin and sea turtle bycatch measures (the ma-
jority of Latin American countries). Market-based access and regulatory strategies
are also stressed as a means of tackling the overfishing problem.
In spite of this, current regulatory stances are extremely distinctive. In Argen-
tina, while 30 species are subject to annual TACs, the decision to assign a TAC in
the country’s hake fishery on the basis of historic catches became a major source of
conflict (Thorpe, Ibarra, and Reid 2000). The conflict was somewhat unsatisfacto-
rily resolved, and despite local scientific objections, grounded in stock sustainability
arguments (Fish Information Services, Sea-World, 4/10/1999).
The Mexican regulatory approach has been somewhat different. While the 1992
Fisheries Law replaced the ‘preferred access’ granted to cooperatives with a permit-
based access system, the country has, to date, refrained from introducing TACs, de-
spite concerns over the level of fishing effort deployed in a number of critical ma-
rine fisheries (SEMARNAP 2000).
Chile, whilst having moved the furthest towards a market-driven TAC/ITQ solu-
tion, has presently only used ITQs in the management of five relatively minor fish-
eries (Ecoceanos 2000; Bernal and Aliaga 1999). Although it was industrial fishing
interests that first opposed the introduction of ITQs in the country’s pelagic fisheries
(Ibarra, Reid, and Thorpe 2000), subsequent attempts to introduce such measures
were frustrated by an amalgam of artisanal fishermen, fish workers, and local envi-
31 At present, a number of fisheries, including hake and scallop, are in the initial pre-assessment stage,
although it is not known how long it will be before certification is granted (MSC 2000)
32 In August/September 1999, the Fisheries Ministry distributed 30,000 copies of the FAO document on
Code of Behaviour for a Responsible Artisanal Fishery to local fishermen’s associations (Fish Informa-
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ronmentalists (World Fishing Sept. 1999:3).33 Nevertheless, the seriousness of the
situation has already induced corporate restructuring within the sector and is likely
to lead to further industry rationalisation (Fish Information Services, Sea-World
2001).
In Peru, although politically powerful industrial fishing interests have histori-
cally stymied attempts to introduce ITQs within the country’s main pelagic fisheries,
the present Fisheries Minister has announced plans to introduce pelagic catch quotas
in the current year (Fish Information Services, Sea-World January 22 2001). Never-
theless, given the magnitude of the emerging regional fishing crisis, one must query
whether such management strategies—as they currently stand and are likely to
evolve—will be capable of instituting effective regulatory mechanisms which will
guarantee stock sustainability over the long term.
Conclusion
Effective management depends upon the extent to which national regulatory institu-
tions, aided and abetted (where necessary) by supranational regulatory forces such
as those delineated above, are able to insulate themselves from local sectarian inter-
ests (Weiss 1997).
In Latin America, these global regulatory trends have been complemented by
neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions which, by pressurizing governments to
improve economic performance whilst simultaneously reducing government outlays,
favour the development of more efficient national fisheries through improved man-
agement policies (Arnason 1998). One inevitable casualty of this has been the open-
access status of the region’s fisheries. Having first been ‘nationalised’ through the
introduction of ocean law regimes during the global trade phase, the emphasis in
this current global regulatory phase favours the assignation of property rights as a
tool to aid in the preservation of designated fish stocks. Although regulatory inter-
vention is predicated on the need to ensure desirable social, economic, and biologi-
cal consequences for the designated fishery, the specific policies adopted (and sub-
sequently implemented and enforced) cannot be abstracted from their institutional
context. Given that effort and/or access restraints are unlikely to meet with universal
industry approval, there is a strong possibility that the management process will be-
come increasingly politicized, with any consequent political compact serving to
compromise effective resource management (Long 1999; Bernal and Aliaga 1999).
This certainly seems to be the case in Latin America, where narrow sectarian in-
terests continue to dominate fisheries policy. In Chile, regulatory capture by local
fishery industrialists has successfully pressurised the government to drop any modi-
fications to existing fisheries legislation that are likely to curb industrial access and/
or fishing effort (Peña-Torres 1997; Fish Information Services, Sea-World 25/10/
1999). Moreover, SONAPESCA, a lobbying group for the country’s large private
fishmeal companies, was instrumental in helping broker the Southeast Pacific Con-
vention for Conserving Straddling Stocks (Kibel 2000). In Argentina, it is a case of
old sectarian interests [as represented by the refrigerated fleet] confronting new sec-
tarian interests [freezer and factory vessels], with a pliant state sacrificing resource
sustainability as part of a local conflict minimisation strategy (Thorpe, Ibarra, and
Reid 2000). Effective management was further compromised in Argentina by the
33 These rejected the ITQ project on the basis that it was a scheme devised by representatives of the
large fishmeal producers and companies operating in the country’s southern demersal fishery which, by
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ease with which provincial fisheries representatives could emasculate the operations
of the main fisheries management body [the Federal Fisheries Council], through the
simple expedient of walking out when proposals unacceptable to their members
were debated, thus leaving the Council without a quorum. A similar story emerges in
Mexico. Here the transition to a new fisheries regime merely encouraged the emer-
gence of a new interest grouping of ‘banker-owners’ within an already overexploited
coastal shrimp fishery (Vásquez León and McGuire 1993).
While the proliferation of international agreements, institutions, and supra-na-
tional regulatory mechanisms affords opportunities for the local
‘internationalisation’ of state capabilities and management tools in a way which re-
sponds to growing concerns about sustainability issues, in Latin America this poten-
tial remains largely thwarted. Rodrik (1998) is perhaps right when he asserts that the
question is not so much to ‘globalise,’ but in the context of global marine fisheries,
how to accomplish this in a desirable (sustainable) way.
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